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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an investigation of the question of the
probative force of the syllogism.

It examines on what the

probative force of propositions constituting

an arqument

depends and some of the cases in which the conclusion of a
syllogism is and is not proven by the premises.
The investigation begins by looking at certain preliminary notions associated with arguments in qeneral and
categorical syllogisms in particular.
syllogism are found two claims.

In each cateqorical

One is the claim to truth

made by each proposition, and another is the claim to validity
made by the syllogism.

Hhen each of these claims are fulfilled

the syllogism is then sound. The question is whether or not
every sound syllogism also represents a proof of the conclusion.
John Stuart Mill asserted that no deductive arqument
including the syllogism can be a proof of the truth of the
conclusion on the grounds that the premises presuppose the
conclusion.

In fact each syllogism is an example of the

fallacy of petitio principii which it must by its very nature
corruni
t.
Alexander Pfander instead claimed that only in certain
cases is the conclusion not proven by the premises, while in
other cases the truth of the conclusion is actually proven by
ii

the truth of the prem1ses.
An independent investigation

of the question of the probative

force of the syllogism is made. Because of a crucial difference
between propositions affirming contingent states of fact and
essentially

necessary propositions affirminq necessary states of

fact, it is shown that no syllogism containing contingent
propositions can be a proof, while a proof is present in the case
of a syllogism containing essentially

necessary propositions.

When

the propositions of an argument are continqent their truth follows
from the fact each particular

existing instance they refer to

actually has what is affirmed by the proposition.

Therefore, if

the syllogism is valid, the conclusion will refer to at least some
of the same particular

existing instances on which the truth of

each of the premises depends. The premises can be true only if the
conclusion is true, and any uncertainty about the truth of the
conclusion extends also to the premises.

The premises cannot prove

the truth of the conclusion since their truth presupposes the
truth of the conclusion.
Propositions which are essentially
gardless of whether or not any particular
ever exist.

necessary are true reinstance exists or will

Because the state of fact is essentially

the predicate is intelligibly

necessary,

grounded necessarily in the subject.

If these kinds of propositions are found in a syllogism, their
truth will not depend on the truth of a conclusion.

Essentially

necessary propositions have probative force, and their presence in
a valid argument results in an actual proof of the conclusion.
iii
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CHAPTER
I
PRELIMINARY
REMARKS
ONTHENATURE
OF SYLLOGISTIC
ARGUMENT
ATION

Deductive argumentation:
An argument is a collection of propositions related in such a
way that the truth of one of them is said to follow from the truth
of the remaining propositions which may number one or more than one.
The proposition which is said to follow from one or more other
propositions is called the conclusion of the argument while the
proposition(s)
the premise(s).

which the conclusion is said to follow from is called
Whenit is said that the conclusion fol1ows from

the premise or premises, this means that the latter

attempt to pro-

vide evidence for the truth of the conclusion by their own truth
through the logical form of the argument. Evidence may be provided
for the truth of the conclusion in two general ways; either
deductively or inductively.
The difference between induction and deduction:
In deductive argumentation, the manner of arqumentation, that
is, the process whereby evidence is provided for the truth of a
proposition is such that the · conclusion is claimed to follow
necessarily from the truth of the premise or premises.

However, in

induction the manner of argumentation claims to yield a true
conclusion which follows with a specific degree of probability and

not with necessity. l

The fact that the true conclusions of

deductive arguments can follow necessarily from true premises
while the true .conclusion of inductive arguments can never
follow necessarily from true premises points to a fundamental
difference in the way the premises are used as evidence for the
conclusion.

In deduction the process of argumentation proceeds

from what is less general to what is more general. 2 A true conclusion could only follow necessarily from true premises if the
relation between premises and the conclusion is from what is more
general to what is of equal or less generality.

Unless this were

so, the conclusion would assert more than was given or provided
for by the premises.

This is precisely wh.at occurs iri the case of

induction for the conclusion asserts more than was actually given
by the premises.
1
There is a certain procedure in mathematics which is called induction whereby one reasons from what is true in some cases to
what is necessarily universally true. For example, one may reason that since a specific feature belongs to some prime numbers,
the feature therefore belongs necessarily to all prime numbers.
The question of whether or not such a method is really induction
or perhaps involves other procedures, and the question of what
bearing the special nature of numbers and mathematical laws have
on this issue is not crucial to this investigation.
2

Someonemay object that induction can proceed from what is particular to~hat is also particular.
One may reason that, for example,
since one room of a house has no rug, and a second room has no rug,
and still a third room has no rug, therefore, the fourth room will
have no rug. However, the inference to the conclusion can only take
place, in this case, based upon a general premise w~ich would be the
result of the examination of the first three cases, and from which
the claim regarding the unobserved case is inferred. Without a
general premise the three observed cases could not be used as
evidence for the fourth unobserved case.

3

The difference in generality between the premises and the
conclusion may consist in the quantification

of the proposition,

or in the generic relation between the terms of one proposition
and the terms of another proposition.

For example, if one talks

about all of the furniture in the house an~ then about some of
the furniture,

then the former is more general than the latter

because the quantifier

II

a1111 is More genera1 than the quantifier

some.11 If, on the other hand, one talks about all of the furniture

11

in the house and then about all of the chairs then the former is
more general than the latter
of furniture.

since a chair represents only one kind

Therefore, if someonewere to argue that since some

of the chairs in the house are made of wood, then all of the chairs
are made of wood, their conclusion would not follow necessarily because the .quantifier of the cone1usion makes the proposition mor·e
· genera1 than. the premise.

In the case, however, when someoneargues

that since all of the furniture in the house is made of wood and
chairs are furniture in the house, then all of the chairs which are
found in the house are made of wood, then the conclusion can follow
necessarily;
and 11chair 11

for the generic relation between the terms 11furniture
is • from greater to lesser qenerality. 3

These remarks should be sufficient

11

to distinguish deduction

from induction.
The difference between immediate and mediate arquments:
Immediate arguments differ from mediate ones in that in the
3By general to particular in this context is not meant the relation of a proposition to actually existing particular instances of
what is affirmed. This relation will be dealt with at length in a
later section.

4

former the argument contains only one premise while in the latter
the argument contains more than one premise. ·· The term immediate"
II

refers to the fact that the argument proceeds directly from one
premise to the conclusion.

The term "mediate" refers to the fact

that the conclusion follows not simply from one premise or the
other premise but from all · premises taken toqether.

This paper

will be concerned with one specific type of mediate deductive
formal argument, namely, the categorical syllogism.
The categorical syllogism4:
A syllogism is one kind of deductive argument which consists
of two premises and a conclusion.
constituting

Whenall of the propositions

the syllogism are categorical propositions,

gism is then a categorical syllogism.
the simplest amongthe various different

the syllo-

Categorical propositions are
kinds of propositions.

This

is shown in the fact that a categorical proposition consists of and
requires ·only a minimumof one subject concept, one predicate concept, and a copula.

Thus a categorical proposition differs from

more complex propositions such as disjunctives

and conjunctives

which may themselves contain categorical propositions;

and it

differs also from propositions in which the copula is restrained

in

some way such as in conditionals.
4
The remarks which will now be made may certainly apply
other kinds of syllogisms besides categorical syllogisms.
investigation will be restricted to categorical syllogisms
of certain unique features which they possess, and because
are used by Mill in the context of his accusation

deductive argumentation.

aqainst

·

to
This
because
they

5

The two-fold claim found in cateqorical syllogisms:
The premises of categorical syllogisms claim to provide
evidence for the truth of the conclusion in two different
ways. Each of these claims must be fulfilled,

otherwise the

truth of the conclusion will not follow necessarily from the
premises.
The pr9position and its claim to truth:
A proposition is to be differentiated

from the mental or

psychological act of judging, from the linguistic

form which ex-

presses the proposition, and from the state of act which it asserts
is the case.

The act of jugging differs from the proposition in

the following way. First,

the act of judging is multiplied as the

same proposition is communicatedfrom person to person.

Secondly~

one can predicate of propositions features which cannot be predica. ted of the act of judqinq like for example that a proposition can
be communicated. The proposition differs
pression first

from the linguistic

ex-

in the fact that the same proposition can be ex-

pressed by different

linquistic

expressions, like when a proposi-

tion is asserted in Germanand the same proposition is asserted in
English or some other language.
linguistic

One can also predicate of a

expression features which cannot be predicated of a

proposition like that a·wo~d in a sentence is misspelled.
Furthermore, a proposition differs from the above in that
only propositions can be true or false.

The proposition makes a

claim to truth which consists in its affirming that a state of fact
obtains.

It lies in the very essence of a proposition that it make

0

this claim to truth.

Truth and falsity

are quite properly pre-

dicable only of propositions amonqthe various other kinds of
thoughts such as invitations,

questions, commands, wishes,

promises, etc.
The claim to truth can be located in the copula of the
propositions,

for it is by the affirmino function of the copula

that the state of fact is claimed to be.
different

This is only one of two

functions found in the copula for its second function

is to relate the predicate to the subject.

It is by this rela-

tion function that someth-inq (the predicate) is predicated of
something else (the subject).

The affirminq function is found

only in propositions while the relating function is found in all
kinds of thoughts with the exception of simple concepts.
Since the categorical sylloqism consists of propositions,
as do all arguments, each of the prooositions make this claim to
truth.

In other words, the claim to truth is made by the premises

and by the conclusion.
One claim found in the syllogism then is the claim made by
each proposition comprisinq the sylloqism that it is true.

There

is a further claim made by the syllogism, namely, its claim to be
valid.
The Claim of the syllogism to be valid:
It lies in the essence of a cateqorical syllogism that it
make a claim of validity;

that is, it makes the claim that due

to the logical relation between the premises and the conclusion,the

conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. 5 This loqical
relation between the premises and the conclusion concerns the
l oqi cal form of the syllogism and is independent from the
question of the truth or falsity

of the propositions. 6 There-

fore, . although a cateqorical sylloqism may be valid this does
not imply that any of the propositions are true.

Whena categori-

cal . s.yllogism is valid the conclusion follows necessarily from the
premises, but the truth of the conclusion need not also necessarily
follow.

This would require that the premises be true and the syllo-

gism be valid.This point will be explained in qreater detail in a
moment. What is important to understand now is that when the conclusion of a valid argument follows necessarily from the premises
this does not give any indication of the truth or falsity
conclusion.

of the

To say that the conclusion of a valid argument follows

necessarily refers to a logical relation of logical necessity between the premises and the conclusion.
The question regarding the source of the claim of validity
which the syllogism makes is an exceedingly difficult

5The term valid

one to

may be used in inductive arqumentation to
refer to the fact that the conclusion follows with a degree of
probability that warrants a reasonable assent. However, considering the fundamental difference existinq between this meaninq
and its meanina within deductive arqumentation, the term valid
will be used throughout this paper to refer to deductive arguments in which the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises.
6This is not to ignore arguments in which the conclusion
follows necessarily from the premises not because of the form of
the arguments but because of a material relation.
Someof these
material inferences are, for example, if A is equal to 8 then
B is equal to A
or if A is earlier than 8 then "B is later
than A.
11

11

11

11

11

11

11

11

;

11

11

11

8

fully answer. To begin with, certain remarks about the constitution of the syllogism must be made. A-categorical syllogism
consists of three and only three categorical propositions.

Two

of the propositions are the premises and one is the conclusion.
The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term and the
subject of the conclusion is called the minor term.

The middle

term is one appearing in each of the premises but not in the
conclusion.

The premise which contains the major term is called

the major premise and the premise which contains the minor term is
called the minor premise.

This means that in a categorical syllo-

gism, there wi11 be three and only three terms each used twice in
the manne~just explained. 7 Thus, according to this explanation,
the following two arguments would not be categorical syllogisms.
All crows are black~
All dog~ have tails.
All cats have fur.
All crows are crows.
All dogs are tats.
All cats are dogs.
Although the first

argument consists of three categorical

propositions it contains more than three terms.

The second

syllogism consists of three categorical propositions,
tains three terms each used twice;

and it con-

however, the middle term is

not found in each of the premises, and neither does the major
7The same claim is made by Freeman, Logic: The Art of
Reasoninq ( NewYork: David McKayCo., Inc. , 1967), p. 145.
Also by Cqpi~·Introduction to Logic, (NewYork: MacMillan Co.,
1972), p. 181.

9

term appear in one premise and the minor term in another.

The

following argument is a qenuine example of a cateqorical syllogism.
All crows are dogs.
All crows are cats.
All cats are dogs~
In this argument there are three categorical propositions,
and three terms each used twice, and further,

the middle term

appears in each premise, and the major term is found in one premise while the minor term is found in theother premise.

In this

way the major term and the minor term are connected in the premises by means of the middle term.

They are brought together, so

to speak, or united by means of the middle term which occurs in
both of them.
It is with this structure

of a categorical syllogism that

its claim to validity can .be found.

It is a claim that lies then

in the formal nature of the categorical syllogism;

that ;~ •it is a

claim which stems from the relation of terms within three categorical propositions. 8 Yet, to what exactly does the term validity
11

11

refer?
The concept validity
11

11

is one sui qeneris.

It cannot be

defined in the sense that it cannot be reduced to some other relation;

nor can it be defined in a way which would enable a person,

. ignorant of what validity is, to understand what it without simply
apprehending it directly.

The following argument is an example of

8rhis is not to be confused with the question regarding upon
whi.ch factors the validity of the syllogism depends. Such factors
would deal with the quantity and quality of the categorical propositions.

10

a valid categorical syllogism:
All crows are dogs.
All cats are crows.
All cats are dogs.
Although validity
11

11

cannot be defined, some of its features

can of course be mentioned and some of the consequences of valid
syllogisms can be po,nted out.

One of the consequences of valid

syllogisms is that if the premises are true then the conclusion
must also necessarily be true.

This does not mean that the pre-

mises are true or that they must be true but only that if they are
true the conclusion must be true.

This is a necessary consequence

of the validity of the sylloqism, but it does not represent a definition

of validity.

Another consequence following from the validity of a syllogism is that if the conclusion is false at least one of the premises
must also be false.

This follows from· the fact that a valid syllo-

gism cannot have two true premises and a false conclusion.
Because these are necessary consequences of a valid syllogism
their absence entails that the syllogism is invalid.

A syllogism

which can have two true premises and a false conclusion cannot be
valid and must be invalid. 9
If an argument were to contain as a premise the very conclusion of the argument, it would be quite true to say that if the
premises are true then the conclusion must necessarily be true.
This follows not from the valid form of the ariwment, but from the
simple fact that the conclusion is itself a premise. Such a possibility would seem to be ruled out in the case of a cateqcrical
syllogism since such an argument, in having the conclusion as a premise, could not have three terms each used twice, etc. The conclusion of a valid cateqorical sylloqism follows from both premises
taken together.

11

Still

another way the notion of validity can be revealed

is by pointing out how the conclusion of a valid syllogism follows
necessarily even though its premises and conclusion are false.
This will be more fully analyzed in the following section dealing
with the soundness of the syllogism.
The soundness of the syllogism:
A syllogism may be valid even though all of the propositions
contained in it are false;
propositions yet still

and a syllogism may contain only true

be invalid.

An example of the former is

the following argument:
All United States citizens are citizens of Cuba.
All citizens of France are citizens of the United States.
All citizens of France are citizens of Cuba.
The propositions which constitute
yet, it is essential
less still

valid.

this sylloqism are all false;

to ~nderstand that the syllogism is nevertheThe conclusion follows necessarily from the two

premises because of the logical form of the argument, and therefore
the necessity with which the conclusion follows is a loqical
necessity.

This logical necessity is absent in the following syllo-

gism although its premises and conclusion are true.
All the inhabitants of the United States live in North America.
All the inhabitants of Texas live in North America.
All the inhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of the United
States.
Each of the propositions

is not valid.

in this syllogism are true,

but the syllogi9TI

The conclusion does not follow necessarily from the

premises although it may at first

glance appear to.

This syllogism

· It

does not possess any of the features of valid ~yllogisms;

the

conclusion need not be true if the premises are true, nor would
the falsity

of the conclusion necessitate

the falsity

of at least

one of the premises.
In the case of a syllogism which possesses a valid form and
which contains true premises the syllogism would then be sound.
An example of a sound syllogism is,
All inhabitants of the United States are inhabitants of
North America.
All inhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of the United States.
All inhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of North America.
The two-fold claim found in each syllogism is fulfilled
syllogism.

The propositions which constitute

true and the syllogism is valid.

in this

the syllogism are

It is by the fulfillment

of this

two-fold claim that the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily
from the truth of the premises.

The truth of the conclusion

follows not simply on the basis of the truth of the premises but
through the valid form of the syllogism.

If a syllogism is only

valid then the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises;
but if a syllogism is valid and the premises are true, then the
truth of the conclusion follows necessarily from the truth of the
premises.

The truth of the conclusion is established by the true

premises though through the validity of the syllogism.
Although the truth of the conclusion of a sound syllogism
follows necessarily

necessarily true.

this does not mean that the conclusion is

A proposition is necessarily true either if it

13

is analytic or if it refers to a necessary state of fact.

The

differences between these two kinds of necessarily true propositions will be investigated in Chapter Three.

In connection with

the soundness of a syllogism it is now important to distinguish
between the truth of a conclusion following necessarily and a
conclusion which is necessarily true.

The truth of the conclusion

of the sound syllogism presented above follows necessarily but it
is not a necessary truth.

It ·is not analytic nor is it synthetic

.! priori. lO
While these remarks concerning sound categorical syllogisms
may be clear enough, John Stuart Mill has made the accusation
that the syllogism, even sound syllogisms, can never "prove" the
truth of the conclusion on the grounds that by its very nature
it must commit the fallacy of petitio

principii.

This assertion

made by Mill and the response made by Alexander Pfander will now
be presented.

10rhe distinction between what is necessarily true and a true
proposition which follows necessarily is not made by Freeman,
Lo~ic: The Art of Reasoninfi, (NewYork: David McKayCo. Inc.
19 7), p. 144~ who claims tat the conclusion of a sound argument
is necessarily true.

CHAPTER
II

..

THEPOSITIONS
OF MILLANDPFANDER

Mill's Accusation:
Regarding the nature of the syllogism, John Stuart Mill
writes the following:
Wehave now to inquire .whether the syllogistic process, that of reasoning from generals to particulars,
is or is not a process of
inference, a proqress
from the knownto the unknown, a means of coming to a
knowledge of something we did not knowbefore.
Logicians have been remarkably unanimous in their
mode of answering this question. It is universally
allowed that a syllogism is vicious if there oe any_thing more in the conclusion than in the premises.
But this is, in fact, to say that nothing ever was or
can be proved by the syllogism which was not knownor
assumed to be knownbefore •.... a syllogism can prove
no more than is involved in the premises. 11
It must be granted that in every syllogism considered
as an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a
peti ti o pri rici pi i. \~henwe say, A11 men are morta1,
Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal," it is
unanswerably urged by the adversaries of the syllogistic
theory, that the propositioij, Socrates is mortal, is presupposed in the more general assumption, All men are
mortal; that we cannot be assured of the mortality of
all men, unless we are already certain of the mortality
of every individual man; that if it be still doubtful
whether Socrates, or any other individual we choose to
name, be mortal or not, the same degree of uncertainty
must hang over the assertion, all men are mortal: that
11

John Stuart Mill~ A System of Logic, (TwoVolume, London:
Longmans,Green·, Reader, and Dyer, 1972) Vol. I, p. 209.
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the general principle, instead of being given
as evidence of the particular case, cannot itself
be taken for true without exception, until every
shadowof doubt which could affect any case comprised
with it, is dispelled by evidence aliunde; and then
what remains for the syllogism to prove? That in
short, no reasoning from qenerals to particulars
can, as such, prove anything: since from a general
principle we cannot infer any particulars, but those
which the principle itself assumes as k~~wn. This
doctrine appears to me irrefragable ....
These two passages represent the core of Mill's attack
against the syllogism, and they must therefore be briefly examined
in order to determine the nature of Mill's claims.

This shall be

done first by looking at Mill's views regarding sylloqistic

argu~

mentation, and secondly by lookinq at what he means when he says
that the syllogism commits the petitio principii fallacy.
Mill's views regardinq syllogistic

arqumentation:

This explanation of Mill's position will begin by pointing
out that Mill means by the term vicious;'in reference to syllogisms
11

what was called invalidity in the first

chapter of this paper.

A

syllogism which is valid would for Mill not be vicious, whil~ one
which is invalid would be vicious.

Mill claims that an argument is

vicious whenever there is more in the conclusion than is found or
assumed in the premises. Another way of stating this would be to
say that an argument is invalid whenever the conclusion asserts
more than is found or contained in the premises. What M~ll would
refer to as a non-vicious argument is one described as valid 1n
the previous chapter.
Ibid., p. 210.

Mill's explanation of validity and invalidity

should not be taken to mean that the conclusion goes quantitatively beyond the premises.
refers to more particuiar

It is not as if the conclusion actually
instances than the two premises combined.

The conclusion of an invalid argument goes beyond the premises in
the sense that it asserts what cannot be substantiated by the
premises.

The conclusion is not something following from the

premises but goes beyond them according to what can be inferred
from them. If the conclusion does not follow necessarily,

it must

therefore assert more than is found in the premises in the sense of
what can be deduced with necessity.

In order to illustrate

Mill's

point, take for example the following invalid argument:
All dogs are animals.
All ·tats ate a~imals.
All cats are dogs.
This syllogism is invalid;

the conclusion does not follow necessay--;.

ily from the two premises. The conclusion goes beyond what is found
in the premises, not in the sense that it refers to more cats or to
more dogs, but in the sense that it claims more than can be deduced
· from the premises. The middle term in being the predicate of both
universal affirmative premises does not allow one to conclude that
the major term is always predicable of the minor term.
Considering again for the momentthe function of the middle
term in some valid categorical syllogisms, it is by the middle term,
which appears in both of the premises but not in the conclusion,
that the major term can be predicated of the minor term. Again, the
major term is the predicate of the conclusion and the minor term is
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the subject of the conclusion.

In one case of a valid cateqorital

syllogism such as one containing three universal affirmative
propositions in the first

figure, it is because what is referred

to by the major term is always predicable of what is referred to
by the middle term, and what is referred to by the middle term is
always predicable of what is referred to by the minor term that it
necessarily follows that what is referred to by the major term
must always be predicable of what is referred to by the minor term.
The middle term functions to, so to speak, bring together the
referents of the major and minor terms. 13 ·A syllogism of this
11

11

form is for example one previously mentioned.
All United States citizens are citizens of Cuba.
All French citizens are citizens of the United States.
All French citizens are citizens -of Cuba.
This syllogism is not sound but it is valid, and the conclusion
does not assert more than is found in the premises, that is, it
does not go beyond in its cl aim what can be deduced ·w;th necessity
from the conclusion.
From this explanation of the nature of validity,

Mill asserts

that the conclusion of any valid syllogism, even syllogisms which
are sound, cannot assert anything new. If the conclusion represents
new knowledge, then it must qo beyond the premises, but if the
conclusion goes beyond the premises, then the syllogism cannot be
The predication

is of what is referred

to by the concepts of

the proposition, for it is foolish to say that in the proposition,
Leaves are green, that green is a property of the concept,
leave.
11
11

11

11
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valid.

The syllogism cannot at the same time assert somethinq

new and also follow necessarily from the two premises.

This is

one assertion of Mill which will later have to be critically
examined. The second assertion closely related to this one is
Mill's claim that the syllogism by its very nature commits the
fallacy of petitio

principii.

The validity of the syllogism &the petitio
It is in establishing

principii

fallacy:

the soundness of the syllogism that

Mill claims the petitio principii

fallacy is unavoidably

committed. It is not merely because of the fact that in a valid
syllogism the conclusion is contained in the premises -- since
it cannot claim more than can be deduced from the premises if
it is to be valid -- that Mill claims a petitio
is present.

principii

fallacy

The validity of -the argument is presupposed in the

following way. Since the conclusion of a valid argument is
contained in the premises, the truth of the conclusion must be
knownif the truth of the premises is known. The truth of the
conclusion is needed to establish the truth of the premises since
the conclusion is contained in the premises, otherwise the syllogism would be invalid.
tablished,

Unless the truth of the conclusion is es-

the truth of the premises remains uncertain .

It is in need-

ing to knowthe truth of the conclusion that the petitio principii
fallacy occurs, for the truth _of the conclusion is used in order
to establish the truth of the premises which are supposea to
establish the truth of the conclusion.

Instead of true premises
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proving the truth of the conclusion, one must knowthe truth of
the conclusion in order to establish the truth of the premises.
This preceding fact is a consequence of the validity of the
syllogism itself.
Mill.'s accusations against the syllogism can be briefly
summarized in the following manner. Since the conclusion of a .
valid syllogism cannot go beyond the premises,

it must in that

sense be contained in them. Yet, if it is contained in them, the
conclusion cannot assert anything new. The conclusion cannot
assert anything new not only because of the validity of the syllogism, but also because the truth of the conclusion must be known
if the truth of the premises is to be known. This follows from
the fact that the conclusion is contained in the premises, and it
therefore amounts to the fallacy of petitio

principii.

The syllo-

gism can never prove the truth of the conclusion for it cannot
arrive at anything new if the syllogism is to be valid and the
truth of the premises known.
It is important to understand that even thouqh Mill claims
that by the validity of the argument the truth of the conclusion
must be knownin order to establish the truth of the premises,
once their truth is established,
still

the argument is nevertheless

sound. The syllogism is sound but the conclusion was not

proven. The truth of the conclusion was not proven since its
truth was needed to establish the truth of the premises.
Before Mill's assertions and accusations are critically
analyzed, Alexander Pfander's remarks on this problem will be
presented.
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Pfander's views on the syllogism:
Although Alexander Pfander in his ·Loqik never explicitly
mentions Mill nor specifically

the petitio

principii

fallacy,

he

certainly has Mill in mind when he writes the following:
Someobjections which hqve been ratsed against
the traditional view of the syllogism address
themselves against the first figure and specifically
against the fact that in the major premise the
general judgement is taken as a universal. The universal judgement it is said already includes the
conclusion and presupposes its truth if itself is to
be true. It is said that in the conclusion no new
judgement is gained but ~nly an unfoldinq of the
major premise is given. 1
Pfander continues by saying that the objection is correct.

This

objection which Pfander describes above is precisely the objection
which Mill raised.

Although Pfander thinks this .objection is

correct, he does not claim that it is applicable to all syllogisms.
In some cases the premises may actually prove the truth of the
conclusion, while in other cases they may not.
mentions the petitio principii

Pfander never

fallacy and instead asserts that in

some syl~ogisms there is no proof since the conclusion of the
syllogism is presupposed by or included in the universal major
premise.

Thus he distingu ·ishe$ ti.etween what he calls a relation-

ship of truth and a relationship
partially

of proof.

This distinction

is

explained in the following passage:
·rn that the argument draws out one judgement from
one or more other judgements, i~ posits at the same
time the truth of the deduced judgement, the

4

A. Pfander, Logik, (Tubingen: MaxNiemeyer Verlag, 1963),
p. 316 (translated by the author of this thesis).

conclusion, as following necessarily from the
truth of the premises. It makes the claim not
only that the premises are true and i t itself is
valid, but also that the truth of the conclusion
is given necessarily with the tr~th of the premises. It presupposes then that between the
premises and the conclusion in fact consists a
definite relation of truth. The relation of truth
which each argument presupposes is however not
necessarily a relation of proof, that is, the
premises, with whose truth is necessarily given
the truth of the conclusion, need not necessarily
prove the conclusion. A relationship of proof
consists namely between the premi~es and the conclusion only then when not only with the truth of
the premises is given necessarily the truth of the
conclusion, but also when the truth of the premises
in no way already presupposes the conclusion. 15
It is clear from this passage that Pfander does not go as far as
Mill for Mill claimed that no syllogism can be a proof.

The reason ,

which Pfander gives in support of the claim that in some cases the
conclusion of an argument, as a particular

judgement, is included

in the premise which is a universal judgement.16 ·However, this
need not be true in every case.

Pfander asserts that the conclu-

ti on of an argument can actually be pr.oven for in some cases
neither premise may presuppose the conclusion.

The question whether

or not the syllogism is a proof depends on what kind of judgements
are found as premises in the syllogism.

Pfander distinguishes be-

tween one kind of universal judgement called a proving deductive
judgement of kind and another kind of universal judgement called a
collective ind~ctive universal judq~ment. The universal .judgement
itself

does not by its form indicate which kind of universal
Ibid., p. 248 (Translated by the author of this thesis).

16--

Ibid., p. 248.
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judgement it is.17

Whenthe premises are collective

inductive

universal judgements then it is only a summaryof all particular
judgements which already assert of each particular

what the

universal judgement asserts. 18 In such a case, the particular
judgements are presupposed by the universal judgement and the
latter

depends on the former for its own truth.

The questio~

whether one has an inductive universal judgement or a provinq
deductive judgement of kind depends on the relationship
the predicate and the subject of the proposition.

between

If the object

referred to by the predicate concept is predicate of the subject
because of the nature of the object referred to by the subject
concept then one has a judgement which is not the mere summaryof
all particular
the particular

judgements, and it will not therefore presuppose
judgements for .its own truth. 19 In the case where

the object referred to by the subject is not the reason for the
predication of the predicate then one has a collective

inductive

universal judgement which can never prove the truth of any particular judgement for it presupposes the truth of each particular
judgement for its own truth. 20
Pfander's explanation of what occurs when the major premise
of a syllogism is a collective
Ibid.,
,a--

p. 329.

fbi d. , p. 320.
19-Ibid.,

20-ibid.,

p. 229-230.
pp. 329, 331.

inductive universal judgement
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corresponds exactly to what Mill asserts.

Pfander disagrees

with Mill since Pfander claims that not all syllogisms need
contain propositions which cannot prove the truth of the
conclusion.

The question whether Mill or Pfander is correct,

and the question whether or not Pfander's defense of the
syllogism is entirely accurate will nowbe considered.

CHAPTER
II I
THENATURE
OFPROOFS
ANDTHECATEGORICAL
SYLLOGISM
The critical

evaluation and examination of Mill's and

Pfander 1 s position on the syllogism will beqin first with an investigation into the issue itself.
they assert is significant

A disagreement or aqreement with what

only on the basis of a present investiga-

tion into the issues which they dealt with, and on the basis of the
results and discoveries such an investigation will yield.
third chapter will be devoted to such an investiqation,

This

while the

fourth chapter will take the results obtained and compare them to
Mill 1 s and Pfander's positions.
The general question with which this third ch?pter will be
concerned is whether or not it is true that all sound syllogisms
are proofs.

In a sound sylloqism, is the truth of the conclusion

always proven by the truth of the premises? In fact, what does it
even mean to say that the truth of the conclusion is

11

proven ?
11

Mill of course asserts that no syllogism, not even a sound syllogism,
can ever prove the truth of the conclusion.

Pfander, however, claims

that only in some instances is it true to say that the, conclusion
was not proven, while in other cases the truth of the conclusion is
proven by the truth of the premises.
The first

section of this chapter will consist of an investi-

gation into the principal reason why in some cases the truth of tha
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conclusion is proven while in other cases it is not.

Although

this analysis will proceed in a direction similar to Pfander s
1

this i nvesti qati on wi11 attempt to go beyond Pfander I s expl anati on and will try to arrive at an accurate analysis of the
problem of the probative force of the syllogism.

In this

connection the question will be raised and discussed in a second
section whether or not the failure of the syllogism to, in some
cases, prove the conclusion is the result of its committing the
fallacy .of petitio principii.

A third section of this chapter

will then attempt to show how in at least one instance a sound
syllogism actually proves the truth of the conclusion.
The absence of probative force in some sound syllogisms:
If a syllogism is to prove the truth of the conclusion,
then the syllogism must of course be sound. The syllogism must
possess a logical form which is valid and each premise must be
true.

Yet, can it be said that when a syllogism is sound that

the truth of the conclusion is proved by the truth of the premises?

It is of course understandable why someonemight

immediately reply in the affirmative;

for the truth of the con-

clusion certainly follows from the truth of the premises through
the validity of the argument. The truth of the conclusion certainly follows but was the truth of the conclusion actually
proven? Did the premises have probative force?

In order to

reveal why the soundness of the syllogism is only a necessary
but not a sufficient

condition for the truth of the conclusion

to be proven, one must examine a specific kind of relation which
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may exist between the premises and- the conclusion of a syllogism.
Someof the relations existing between the premises and
the conclusion of a valid syllogism have previously been mentioned.

For example, in a valid syllogism if the premises are

true then the conclusion must also be true;

or in a valid syllo-

gism, if the conclusion is false, one of the premises must also
be false.

Even the validity of a syllogism itself

relation between the premises and the conclusion.

points to a
These relations

are grounded in the logical structure of the syllogism and for
this reason can quite simply be called logical relations.

However,

these relations can also be called formal relations since they
are independent of the material content of the propositions which
constitute the syllogism.
is irrelevant

The material content of the premises

to the question of the validity of the syllogism.

This was pointed out before in Chapter One.
However, the relation which is crucial to the question of
· the probative force of the premises in a ·sound syllogism is a
material relation dealing with the material content of the propositions which comprise the argument. If a specific kind of
material relation exists between the premises and the conclusion
of a\ sound argument, then the premises cannot prove the truth of
the conclusion if they are themselves to be true.

In order to

show exactly what this relation is, first

an important distinc-

tion must be made between two essentially

different types of

propositions based precisely upon their material content.

't./

The difference between continqent and essentially
propositions: continqent propositions:
The word contingent
11

11

necessary

may apply either to the existence of a

thing or to the essence of a thing.
Smith is wearing a blue shirt,"

In the propositions,

Mr.

the affirmed state of fact is con-

tingent since Mr. Smith need not wear a blue shirt;
necessary that he wear a shirt of some particular
might very well wear a shirt of a different
or even no shirt at all.

11

it is not
color.

He

color instead of blue

The proposition is contingent since the

state of fact it affirms need not be and could not be otherwise.
Of course Mr. Smith's existence is also contingent;
necessarily exist.

What is of interest

he does not

and importance for the

problem under consideration is not contingency as applied to the
existence of ,a thing, but contingency when it refers to the essence
of a thing.

The state of fact affirmed in the proposition pre- .

sented above is contingent since it does not belonq necessarily to
the essence of Mr. Smith that he wear a blue shirt.

It does not

belong necessarily to the essence of Mr. Smith that he wear a shirt
of some particular

color and therefore the state of fact that he is

wearing a blue shirt is contingent.

It need not be and could

be otherwise.
Since the state of fact is contingent, the proposition which
·affirms this state of fact can also be called contingent, and if
the proposition is true, its truth can be called a contingent
truth.

If it is said that in a proposition the predicate need

not belong to the subject, properly speaking what is meant is
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that what is referred to by the predicate concept of the proposition does not belong necessarily to that which is referred to by
the subject concept.

The referent of the subject concept could

lack the predicate and have a different

predicate instead.

The nature of contingent states of fact will perhaps become
more apparent if one contemplates the nature of the states of fact
affirmed in each of the followinq two propositions:
l) Somechairs are made of wood.
2) All the womenin the audience are unmarried.
The state of fact affirmed in each proposition is contingent.

A

chair, to be a chair, need not be made of wood and it is possible
that it be made from some other material like for example plastic
or some kind of metal.

Likewise, the womenin the audience need

not be unmarried; some or even all of them could have been married.
These states of fact are contingent since one element of the state
of fact (what is referred to by the predicate) does not belong
necessarily to the essence of the other element (what is referred ·
to by the subject).

In this way, one could say that the predicate

does not belong to the subject necessarily and that therefore the
proposition is contingent.

If the proposition is true, its truth

is only contingent.
Essenti ally necessary propos i ti ans :
Whena proposition is necessary, its necessity may consist
in a specific kind of logical relation between the subject concept
and the predicate concept, or its necessity may consist in the
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fact that what is referred to by the predicate concept belongs
necessarily to the essence of what is referred to by the subject
concept.

In the former case the predicate concept affirms either ·

partially

or completely what is already affirmed by the subject

concept.

It is partial

for example in the proposition "All

beachelors are unmarried," since being unmarried makes up only
part of the concept bachelor;
proposition,

bachelors are also male.

In the

''All computers are computers" the predicate merely

repeats completely what is found in the subject.
affirms exactly what the subject affirms.

The predicate

These propositions,

which can be called analytic since the predicate does not affirm
something different

from the subject, must necessarily be true

due to this relation between the subject concept and the predicate
concept.21
However, in the case of propositions which are essentially
necessary, the predicate refers to something different

than what

is referred to by the subject -- for whi ch reason these propositions can be called synthetic as opposed to analytic -- and
therefore their necessity lies not in any logical relation between
the subject concept and the predicate concept, but in the fact
that what is referred to by the predicate concept belongs necessar~
ily to the essence of what is referred to by the subject concept.
The predicate belonqs necessarily to the subject even though the
The term analytic is here used in the sense in which it
applies to identity statements and to cases in which the predicate is part of ·what is included in the subject concept.
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predicate is different

from the subject.

The proposition is

necessary because the state of fact it asserts is necessary.
What is referred to by the subject provides a reason for the
predication of what is referred to by the predicate.
the predicate belongs to the subject necessarily.

Further,
One element

of the state of fact (what is referred to by the predicate) belongs
to the essence of the other element (what is referred to by the
subject) necessarily.
essential

This necessity can therefore be called an

necessity, which differs from analytic necessity and from

contingent states of fact and propositions.22

This difference will

becomeclearer if one compares the contingent propositions examined
above with the following two essentially

necessary propositions.

1) A square necessarily has diagonals equal in length.
2) Color must necessarily be extended in at least two
dimensions.
The states of fact asserted by each proposition are essentially
necessary.

It belongs necessarily to the essence of a square that it

have diagonals equal in length, just as it belongs necessarily to the
essence of color that it be extended in two dimensions.
asserted states of fact cannot be otherwise;
the state of fact be different.
proposition is essentially

Each of the

it is impossible that

In this way one can say that the

necessary since the state of fact is

It should perhaps be also pointed out that all analytic propositions presuppose propositions which are essentially necessary.
They presuppose certain truths on the general nature of being, like
for example, the law of identity, and the law of non-contradiction.
They also presuppose certain truths regarding the nature of truth,
necessity, concepts, propositions, etc.
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essentially

necessary;

or simply that the predicate belongs
necessarily to the subject . 23
The difference in the truth of contingent and necessary
propositions: particular instances and propositions:
The difference between contingent and essentially

necessary

propositions points to a difference in the conditions under which
each of them can be true.

Of course each of them is true only if

and whenever what the proposition affirms corresponds to rea 1i ty. •
However, what each proposition corresponds to will of course be
different,

and the conditions which must be fulfilled

order for

contingent propositions to be true are not the same conditions
which must be fulfilled
tions to be true.

in order for essentially

necessary proposi-

These differences must be explained in detail

for it is with .these differences that the probative force of the
premises in the sylloqism depend.
In speaking of conditions for the truth of propositions, more
specifically

what is meant here in this context is the dependency

which each proposition has upon particular
what is affirmed by the proposition.
different

existing instances of

There are at least three

relations of dependency which the truth of a proposition

Because conti~gency may refer either to a thing's exi stence
or to its essence, a proposition may refer to an object which has
a contingent existence yet which has certain necessary features in
its essence. This color brown need not exist but certainly the
fact that it is here and now necessarily extended means that the
state of fact grounded in this brown is a necessary state of fact .
The term "essentially necessary" proposition will be used to refer
only to propositions affirming a necessary state of fact which has
no contingency either in existence or essence.

32

may in principle have on particular

instances or examples. How-

ever, before these three possible relations

are examined, the

following difference between contingent and necessary propositions
should be stressed for it will be crucial in deciding which of the
three relatons apply to contingent propositions and which of them
apply to essentially

necessary propositions.

It was mentioned before that in speaking of a contingent
proposition, what was meant strictly

speaking is that the state of

fact which the proposition affirms is continqent.

The state of fact

is contingent because one element of the state of fact does not belong to the other element necessarily.

The proposition which asserts

a contingent state of fact is also contingent.

The question, how-

ever, is in what sense one can speak of the truth of a contingent
proposition as also being contingent.
i~ certairily continqent.

A true contingent proposition

The state of fact could change. Thus, in

the examples of contingent propositions quoted above, it is possible
that there be no chairs made of wood; or some of the womenin the
audience may becomemarried or married womenmay enter the audience.
Therefore, the .state of fact that some chairs are made of wood is
contingent and the proposition which affirms this state of fact can
for this reason be called contingently true.

But does the proposi-

tion which is contingently true becomefalse if the contingent
state of fact which it affirms changes? To be sure, the proposition
need not ever have been true, for the state of fact need never have
obtained.

But can a contingent proposition once it is true ever

becomefalse?
reason.

It would seem that it cannot for the following
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Suppose someoneasserts that some of the chairs in the room
in which he is standing are made of wood; and suppose that he is
correct.

Suppose further that after he has made the true asser-

tion all of the woodenchairs in the room are removed. If the
same person were to now assert that some of the chairs in the room
in which he is standing are made of wood, then what he asserted
would of course be false;

for it is now the case that no chair in

the room is made of wood. But is the proposition which he first
asserted the same proposition he asserted later?

Not if there was

the element of time included in each of the two assertions.

Given

this element of time one-proposition can only be true or false,
and, once it is either,

its truth or falsity

cannot change. With-

out this element of time the same proposition would be true and
false;

for one could not claim that it is at one time true and at

another time false.
false,

Since a proposition cannot be both true and

it would seem that the truth of a contingent propositio,:i

must be described in the following way.
Although one may speak of a contingent state of fact as
changing, one cannot say that the truth of a contingent proposition
can change. A contingent proposition cannot at one time be true
and at another time be false.

On~e it is true then it remains

forever true, even though a different
time obtain.

state of fact may at a later

The contingently true proposition is still

not

necessarily true for the state of fact to which it corresponds is
still

contingent.

The contingent proposition need never have been

true because the state of fact need never have been.

The situation

is quite different

necessary proposition.

in the case of an essentially

The state of fact with which the proposition

corresponds cannot change, and therefore there is no question that
an essentially

necessary proposition is forever true.

true because of the essential

It is always

necessity of the state of fact.24

This difference between contingent and essentially

•

necessary

propositions should be kept in mind during the proceeding discussion
of the relation between the truth of propositions and the existence
of particular

instances of what it affirms.

The first relation of dependency; the actual existence
of particular instances:
Somepropositions not only assert that the predicate belongs
to the subject but also imply that instances of the subject actually
exist.

The proposition,

men actually exist.
at previously.

"Menare wearing blue shirts,"

implies that

The same is true of other propositions looked

The proposition,

"Somechairs are made of wood,"

implies that chairs actually exist;

and the proposition,

"All the

womenin the audience are unmarried" implies that there are actually
womenin the audience.

Certainly any proposition which implies that

particular

instances actually exist cannot be true unless there are
actually existing instances. 25 This first relation of dependency is
The meaning of essential necessity should not be confused with
the fact that a proposition which corresponds with reality must be
true, and the fact that it must then be true since a proposition
cannot be true and false.
25
The question whether or not the non-existence of particular
instances entails the falsity of a proposition which implies that
particular instances exist is a question very difficult to fully
answer, and will not be investigated.
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is sufficiently

explained by sayinq that if a proposition implies

that particular

instances of what it asserts do in fact exist,

then the proposition cannot be true unless there are existing
instances.
The ~resence of conformity between the Proposition and
particular instances:
Another way the truth of a proposition depends upon particular
instances is that unless each particular

instance conforms to the

way the proposition asserts they will be -- if they exist -- the
proposition cannot be true.
blue shirts,"

In the proposition,

"Menare wearinq

unless each man is wearing a blue shirt the proposi-

tion is not true.
from the first

This relation of dependency is quite distinct

relation.

This second relation of dependency exists

regardless of whether or not a proposition implies that particular
instances exist.

Thus, in the proposition,

be embodied in persons,

11

"Moral values can only

althouqh the proposition does not imply

that there are any existing persons possessinq a moral value, it is
still

quite true to say each being which possesses a moral value

must be a person, otherwise the proposition is false.

But the

proposition is not false if no persons bearing moral values exist.
This second relation of dependency can therefore be framed
in the form of a conditional proposition by saying that all particular instances must be in conformity with the proposition,
they exist.
from the first

if

It is clear that this second relation is different
relation introduced above. The first

relation

referred to the fact that a proposition which implies the existence
of particular

instances can only be true if particular

instances
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actually exist, but the fact that they exist does not mean they
are true.

The particulars must also conform to the way the

prpposition asserts they will be, and this second relation applies
whether or not the proposition also implies that particular
instances exist.
This is further shownin the fact that one can take out from
a proposition its implication of the existence of particulars,
this second relation of dependency nevertheless still

yet~

remains.

For example, one o·f the propositions quoted above can be reformulated into the conditional,"If men exist, men are wearing blue shirts,"
which allows one to prescind from the question of whether or not
men actually exist.

Nevertheless, the conformity of the proposi-

tion with particular instances, should they exist, is still
necessary requirement for the truth of the proposition.

a

Therefore,

any particular instance, whether possible or real, must conform to
the proposition if the proposition is to be true.

If there are

particular instances, unless they conform to what is asserted by
the proposition, the proposition cannot be true.
Someprohositions are true because of the way particulars
while ot er propositions are not:

are,

The third relation of dependency a proposition may have on
particular instances is muchmore difficult

to comprehendfor it

can easily be confused with either of the fi-r,st two relations
already mentioned.· In order to avoid as much
. confusion as possible,
it should be immediately pointed out that this third relation of
dependency is characteristic

only and always of continqent

propositions and is never present in essentially necessary
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propositions. Thi_sthird relation of dependency
can be described
in the following way. A proposition is dependent on particular
instances when the proposition is true because the particular
instances exist in the manner claimed by the proposition.

One

can explain and demonstrate this according to the following
procedure.

Since this third relation of dependency is always

found in contingent propositions and never in propositions whichare essentially

necessary, by comparing these two kinds of pro-

positions this third relation should becomeapparent.

These two

kinds of propo~itions will be compared in a specific way. An
example of each of these two kinds of propositions will be put in
a form such that each of them has the same relation of dependency
on particulars which the other has except for this third relation.
In this way, the third relation of dependency will be clearly
manifested.
In the proposition, "Menare wearing blue shirts,

if men

exist," the implication of existence has been taken out of the
proposition.

Therefore, the first

possible relation of dependency

the truth of a proposition can have on particular

existing _· - ·

instances is not present, although the second relation of dependency still

remains.

In the proposition, "Moral values can

only be embodied in persons,

11

there is no implication that actual

instances exist although the second relation of depend.ency is
still

present.

The two propositions are alike in that the first

relation of dependency is absent in each, while the second relation of dependency is present in each.

Yet, the contingent

proposition is nevertheless dependent on particulars

in a way the
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essentially

necessary proposition is not.

It is possible to

say of the necessary proposition that it is true regardless of
whether or not any particular
even if no particular

instances exist.

It is true

instance ever existed or will ever exist .

There is a freedom from particular

instances which is not pre-

sent in the case of the contingent proposition.

The contingent

proposition quoted above does not imply that any particular
instances actually exist, yet, one cannot say of the contingent
proposition that it is true even if no particular
exist, have existed, or will ever exist.
necessary proposition the particular

instances .

Unlike the essentially

instances are needed (even

if they are not implied) to establish the truth of the proposition;

and the proposition is true because the particular

stances are the way the proposition asserts them to be.
opposite is the case with essentially
The particular

inThe

necessary propositions.

instances are they way they are because of the

truth of the essentially

necessary proposition.

The presence or absence of this third relation of dependency on particular

instances goes back to the fundamental

difference between contingent and essentially
tions or states of fact.

necessary proposi-

In a contingent proposition,

since

the predicate need not belong to the subject, the proposition
is true not only unless but because the particulars
the proposition asserts them to be.
necessary proposition,

are the way

In an essentially

since the predicate belongs necessarily

to the essence of the subject any particular

instance possessing
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the essence talked about in the proposition must also possess
the predicate.

This means that the proposition can be true

even if no particular

instances exist,

and if they exist they

must possess the predicate since the proposition is necessarily true.

The nature of this third relation of dependency will

becomeeven clearer when one examines the following question.
It is the questio~ regarding whether or not all contingent
propositions imply the existence of particular
if this is ever so with essentially

instances, and

necessary propositions.

This question will now be answered in the context of the more
general question concerning the presence or absence of either
of these three relations of dependency on particular
with respect to contingent and essentially
The deeendency on particular instances;
essentially necessary propositions:

instances

necessary propositions.
contingent and

A contingent proposition may but need not imply that
particular
tion,

instances actually exist.

The contingent proposi-

Menare wearing blue shirts" certainly does, but the

11

proposition framed in the form of a hypothetical does not.
proposition,
still

"Menare wearing blue shirts,

The

if men exist,•• is

contingent although the implication of existence has been

taken away. Of course, the latter proposition is a hypothetical and not a categorical proposition, yet, it is nevertheless
still

contingent.

One can conclude that all categorical

propositions which are contin gent imply the existence of
particular

instances.
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Essentially necessary propositions never imply the
existence of particular

instances.

The predication is always

of what belongs to the subject and therefore the existence of
the subject is . not implied.2 6
It may be ambiguouswhether or not a proposition implies
that particular
proposition,

instances actually exist.

For example, in the

''All colors are necessarily extended in two dimen-

sions," it is unclear whether or not the proposition is referring
to the fact that all existing colors are extended, or to the fact
that a color must be extended in two dimensions in order to
exist.

In the former case, since there is an implication of

_existence, particular

instances must exist otherwise the proposi-

tion cannot be true.

In the latter case, since there is no im-

plication of ~xistence, no particulars

need exist in order for

the proposition to be true.
Regarding the second relation of dependency, the truth of
a proposition can have on particular

instances, all propositions

have such a dependency. The proposition, whether it be contingent or necessary, can only be true if the particular

instances

conform to what is asserted by the proposition . . One could say
that the proposition could not be true if there were counterexamples~ In the case of essentially
the particular

necessary propositions,

instances must conform because of the necessary

26The exception to this would be the proposition which
asserted that existence belonged necessarily to the essence of
a being.
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truth of the proposition, while in the case of contingent propositions,

there is no necessity that the particular

conform to what the proposition asserts.

instances

This means that the

possibility

of counter-examples is ruled out in the case of

essentially

necessary propositions.

possible.

This latter

A counter-example is im-

difference points to the third relation

of dependency which i~ always present in contingent propositions
but never present in essentially

necessary propositions.

Still,

the second relation of dependency is present in both, for if
particular

in~tances exist, then they must conform with the

proposition, otherwise the proposition is false.
Continqent categorical propositions and essentially
necessary propos1t1ons:
Since the general concern of this paper is with categorical syllogisms and therefore categorical propositions,
remarks should now be made regarding the three relations

a few
of

dependency as they apply to categorical propositions both contingent and necessary.
A contingent categorical proposition possesses all three of
the relations

of dependency which the truth of a proposition may

have on particular
be true, particular

instances.

instances must exist, they must conform to

what the proposition asserts,
particular

In order for the proposition to

and it is because of the way the

instances are that the proposition is true.

the contingent categorical proposition,
hair," its truth depends first

Thus, in

''All womenhave brown

on there existing women,secondly
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in that unless they have brown hatr, the proposition cannot be
true, and thirdly if the proposition is true, it is true because the particular

instances conform to what is asserted by

the proposition.
An essentially

necessary categorical proposition does not

possess the first

or the third relation of dependency on parti-

cular instances.

It does possess the second, fqr if particular

instances do exist then they must correspond to what the proposition asserts.
tion,

In the essentially

necessary contingent proposi-

The square necessarily has diagonals equal in length,"

11

there need not be existing instances of squares in order for the
proposition to be true.
cular instances exist.
particular

This means there is no implication that

instances exist, nor is the proposition true because

the particular
to be.

The proposition is true even if no parti-

instances are the way the proposition asserts them

However, one can still

say that if particular

instances do

exist then they must conform to what is asserted by the proposition, although their lack of conformity is impossible because of
the essential

necessity of the proposition.

The question which must now be discussed is what significance these results have with respect to the investigation

into

the difference between sound syllogisms and proofs.
Sound cateqorical sylloqisms and continoent categorical
propositions:
Whenpremises of a categorical syllogism, even a sound
categorical syllogism, are contingent propositions then the
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truth of the conclusion cannot be proven by them. Contingently
true propositions cannot prove the truth of the conclusion, even
if the syllogism is valid.

The fact that they are contingent

means they have no probative force.
premises precludes the possibility

The contingency of the
that by their truth and the

validity of the argument, the truth of the conclusion can be
proven. 27 The reason for this can be explained in the following
way using the information which has been presented up to this
point;
If the premises of a categorical

syllogism are contingent,

their truth depends on the existence of particulars

in the three

ways which were explained above. What is presently of significance is the third relation described.

It was that contingent

propositions are true because the particulars
proposition asserts them to be.

are the way the

In other words, since the

predicate does not belong necessarily to the essence of the
subject, the proposition is true because each instance of the
subject happens to have what is referred to by the predicate.
The particular

instances need not have the predicate since the

proposition is only contingent.

In this sense it is the fact

that they have the predicate which is the reason for the truth
of the proposition.
that a particular
predicate,

It is therefore quite appropriate to say
instance of the subject happens to have the

since the predicate need not belong to the subject.

See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book I,
Chapter 6, 75a, 18-22.

Chapter
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Therefore the particular

instance having the predicate is prior

to the truth of the proposition and is somethinq upon which the
truth of the proposition depends and follows from.
In the case of a cateqorical syllogism containing premises
which are contingent like for example, .
. All the people in the room are married .
.All the university faculty are in the lroom.
All the university faculty are Married.
each of the premises are contingent, which means they are true
because each particular
cate affirms.

instance happens to have what the predi-

It is possible that some people in the room be

unmarried, and not all of the university faculty need be in the
room. Each premise would be true if each person in the room is
married and-i-f the entire university faculty are in the room.
The first

important point which must be recoqnized is that the

particular

instances upon which the truth of each premise depends

are at least some of the particular
conclusion.

instances referred to by the

This of course presupposes that the ar~ument is valid.

This presupposition of the validity only guarantees that the particular instances referred to by the conclusion .are the same particular instances referred to

by

the premises.

The presupposition

of validity can be further explained the followinq way.
The particular

instances referred to by the conclusion are

at least some of the particular

instances upon which the truth of

the major premise depends, given the truth of the minor premise.

In other words, if all the university faculty are in the
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room, then each of them must be married, otherwise the major
premise cannot be true.
In a similar way, the truth of the minor premise depends
upon the particular

instances referred to by the conclusion

provided that the major premise is true.

If all the people in

the room are married, each faculty membermust be married,
otherwise the minor premise cannot be true.
The particular

instances upon which the truth of each

premise depends are at least some of the particular

instances

referred to by the conclusion, and in this way the truth of
each premise presupposes the truth of the conclusion.
at least some of the particular

Because

instances are the same, any

uncertainty regarding the truth of the conclusion extends to the
premises.

The premises cannot very well prove the truth of the

conclusion if they presuppose the truth of the conclusion for
their own truth.

Without the truth of the conclusion they

themselves cannot be true since they have ..at least some particular instances in corrmon.
It represents no objection to these findings to claim that
one premise, whether it be the -major or the minor, presupposes
the truth of the conclusion only if the other premise is true.
The truth of the other premise serves only to guarantee that the
particular

instances which the truth of the premise would follow

from are at least some of the particular
the conclusion.

instances referred to by

The presupposition is still

one dealing with the

material content of the premises even though the validity of the

"TV

syllogism may be presupposed. Each premise presupposes the
truth of the conclusion not simply because the argument is
valid.

They each presuppose the truth of the conclusion because,

in being contingent propositions,
fact that ea~h particular
have the predicate.

their truth depends on the

instance of the subject happens to

That each particular

instance has the pre-

dicate is in some sense prior to the truth of the proposition.
Therefore, if at least some of the particular

instances upon which

the truth of a proposition depends are also referred to by another
proposition, the first
second proposition,

proposition cannot prove the truth of the

since the truth of the second proposition is

presupposed for the truth of the first
illustrated

proposition.

This can be

in a less complex way than the argument.form of a

categorical syllogism.
From the proposition,

"All chairs are brown, one can argue
11

that, "Somechairs are brown.

11

certainly valid.

This immediate argument form is

However, since the premise of the argument is

only contingent, its truth follows from each particular

instance

(each chair) having the predicate {brown). The conclusion of the
argument refers to at least some of the . instances which the truth
of the premise depends upon, and therefore the truth of the conclusion is presupposed by the truth of the premise.
truth of .the proposition,
each particular

Since the

"All chairs are brown, depends upon
11

instance of a chair in fact being brown, the truth

of the proposition presupposes already that some of the particular
instances of chairs are brown.
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This third relation of dependency which results from the
fact that the proposition is contingent is present even in more
complex argument forms such as the categorical syllogism.

The

truth of the conclusion is presupposed by each premise, if the
premises are contingent, for the particular

instances referred

to by the conclusion are at least some of the particular

instances

referred to by the premises and which the truth of the premises
would depend upon. The true premises cannot prove the truth of
the conclusion, for the truth of the conclusion is presupposed
by the truth of the premises since they refer to some of the same
particular

instances

on which their truth depends.

Although these remarks may becomeclearer by showing how
this third relation of dependency on particular
absent in necessary propositions,

instances is

and how a categorical

gism containing premises which are essentially

syllo-

necessary can

actually prove the truth of the conclusion, one must first
examine whether or not the relation of dependency which the premises have on the conclusion amounts to the fallacy of petitio
principii.
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The Fallacy of Petitio Principii:
Fallacies are errors ~r mistak!s in reasoning, and they
have generally been classified
11

informal

11

•

under the headings, "formal" and

A few remarks must therefore be made regarding the

meaning of these two terms.
Formal and informal fallacies:
Formal fallacies

are errors in reasoning that affect the

formal relation of validity between the premises and the conclusion.

With respect to the syllogism, an example of a formal

fallacy is that of "negative premises."

This mistake refers to

the fact that any categorical syllogism with two premises that are
each negative must be invalid and cannot be valid.

The premises

and also the conclusion may by chance be true, but the argument
is necessarily invalid.
Informal fallacies,
tion of validity,

however, do not affect the formal rela-

but instead affect the truth of the premises of

the argument. An argument can be formally valid yet commit an
informal fallacy.
illustrate

The consideration of the two examples may

this point.

In the informal fallacy of ad verecundium (appeal to
authority) or the informal fallacy of ad populum (appeal to the
majority),

an error occurs because of the falsity

of one of the

premises in the argument. For example, an argument may have as a
conclusion, "Murder is morally wrong," and a premise, "Most people
think murder is mora•lly wrong." The missing premise of this

28 which would make it valid is the premise, "What
enthymeme
most people think is true is true." However, this latter
premise is false and can, by its material content, be classified
as the fallacy which occurs when the truth of a proposition is
said to follow from the fact that a majority of people think it
is true;

or simply the fallacy of appeal to the majority.

The same is true of the fallacy of ad verecundium. In this
case, the false premise would assert that a person who was an
authority in one particular

field was also an authority in

another unrelated field.
The numerous informal fallacies

are classified

according

to the material content of the proposition which is used as a
premise to establish the validity of the arqument.
The question now presents itself
petitio

principfi

whether or not the

fallacy affects the validity of the arqument,

or .the truth of the premises;

or perhaps whether or not it

affects some other feature of the argument. If the fallacy of
petitio

principii

affects the validity of the argument then it

would be a formal fallacy;

and it would follow that no valid

argument could commit this fallacy and retain its validity.
on the other hand, the petitio

principii

If,

affects the truth of

one of the premises, a valid argument could commit this fallacy
although the argument could never be sound. Another alternative
28
An enthymemeis an argument in which one of the premises
or the conclusion is missing. The argument can be valid or invalid.
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still

remains in that perhaps even a sound argument can be a

petitio

principii.

What is this fallacy,

and what is it exactly

that occurs when this fallacy is committed?
Circularity

in arguments; beqging the question29:

A begging of the question represents a certain failure to
demonstrate or prove the proposition which is in need of proof. 30
Aristotle writes that, " ..•. since we get to knowsome things
naturally through themselves and other things by means of something else .... whenever a man tries to prove what is not selfevident by means of itself,

then he begs the original question.
This may be done by assuming what is in question at once..• 1131
Since a proposition which was self-evident

would not require any

proof, no begging of the question can occur.

The question now is

in what ways a proposition which is not self-evident

may be

offered as proof of itself.
This may first

be done simply by repeating the conclusion

of an argument as a premise within the same argument. With
respect to this first

way, Aristotle

says that, "this is easily

detected when put in so manywords; but it is more apt to escape detection in the case of different

terms, or a term and an

express ion that mean the same thing. 1132 Thus, according to this

29The. terms "begging the question" and "petitio principi i"
should be taken in this work to b~ synonymou~.
30
Aristotle; -Prior analytics, Book II, Chapter 16 64b,28-29.
31

Ibid., 64b, 34-39.

32--

Aristotle;

Topics, Book VII, Chapter 13, 162b, 34-163a.
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description,

the following argument would beg the question or

committhe fallacy of petitio

principii:

What is handed downto you by your parents is an
hereditary factor.
The color of one's eyes is handed downto you by
four parents.
he color of one's eyes is an hereditary factor. 33
If a person who asked for proof of this conclusion were
offered this syllogism, he might quite readily admit the soundness
of the argument, but in all likelihood would also respond that
the conclusion was not really proven; for the minor premise
and the conclusion are identical.
is meant "a characteristic

Since by "hereditary factor"

handed downto you by your parents,"

the minor premise asserts the same thing as the conclusion.

They

each affirm the same state of fact and are the same proposition,
although their linguistic
premise is a different

form is of course different.

The minor

sentence than the conclusion, but they

have the same meaning. The conclusion appears to have been begged
for it is not self-evident and it is offered as proof of itself. 34
One problem which exists with the claim that this argument begs
the question can be put in the form of the following objection:
since two of the terms used in the argument are really synonymous
one does not even have a syllogism, though it may appear so on
the level of linguistic

form. Therefore, according to the difference

This example is used by Kreyche, Loqic for Underqraduates
(MewYork: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961) p. 280.
34

Aristotle;
Prior analytic$, Book II, Chapter 16, 65a,
10-16 and 65a, 19-25.

:n :

in words which are used, what is presented certainly appears to
be a syllogism but it is not since it does not have three terms
each used twice, etc.35

The argument which was presented above

would not be a syllogism, but a kind of tautology on the level of
argument.36 The truth of the conclusion follows necessarily
given the truth of the premises, yet because one premise is
merely analytic,

the truth of the conclusion follows in part

from the logical necessity proper to all analytic propositions.
It must be granted that, according to the description of
a categorical syllogism presented in Chapter One, the argument
presented above would not be a categorical syllogism, since it
does not contain three terms.

What kind of an argument it -

exactly is is a question which· cannot be fully analyzed in the
present work. In any case, the argument is certainly not a
proof.
A second way an argument may beg the question can be described in the following manner. Consider the case in which a
person presents an argument which is sound, but is then
· questioned by a second person as to the evidence for the truth
of one of the premises, for example, the major premise.

The

person who presented the argument has been asked to justify
This difficulty concerning how a categorical syllogism
can on the one hand have three terms each used twice, but on the
.other sometimes commit a petitio .: principii by the conclusion
merely being repeated as a premise is overlooked by Freeman,
Lo~ic: The Art of Reasoning (NewYork: David McKayCo., Inc.
19 7. Comparep. 145 with p. 290.
36
The possibility of a tautology on the level of argument
was suggested to me by Dr. Josef Seifert.

the truth of one of the premises.

Suppose he were now to pre-

sent a second argument in support of the truth of the major
premise of the first

argument, and in this second argument the

conclusion of the first

argument appears as a premise.

This is

precisely what occurs in the following arguments.37
l ) To accept the
a myth.
To believe in
the authoritt
To believe in
a myth.
2)

authority of Genesis is to accept
the doctrine of creation is to accept
of Genesis.
the doctrine of Creation is to accept

To believe in the doctrine of creation is to accept
a myth.
To accept the authority · of Genesis is to believe in
the doctrine of creation.
To accept the authority of Genesis is to accept a
myth.

The conclusion of the first

argument is used as the major premise

in the second argument in order to attempt to prove the truth of
the major premise of the first
the first

argument. The major premise of

argument is the conclusion of the second argument, and

follows necessarily from the premises.

In fact both syllogisms

are sound, but there is no proof involved.
circularity

There is instead a

existing between the premises and the conclusions of

both arguments taken together.

A petitio

principii

is present

since the conclusion is used as evidence for its own truth, even
though this occurs indirectly
syllogisms.

in the form- of two categorical

The two arguments are each categorical syllogisms

The following example is used by Freeman, Logic: The Art
of Reasoning (NewYork: David McKayCo., Inc. 196,), p. 291.
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so the objection which was raised above does not in this case
apply.
It is important to understand that the petitio
fallacy,

principii

at least insofar as it has been explained up to this

point, does not affect either the validity of the argument or
the truth of the premises.

Therefore, a sound argument may

commit this "mistake" in reasoning.
in a petitio

principii

The circularity

affects the possibility

present

of the conclusion

being proven by the premises.
A new and different

sense of a petitio

principii

is present

in the case when a premise is knownthrough a knowledge of the
conclusion, although it may not be that the only way the premise
could have been knownis by means of the conclusion.

Suppose

then that a person is presented with the following argument:
All of the people in the room are married.
All the University faculty are in the room.
All the University faculty are married.
Suppose further that by chance he comes to knowthat all of the
people in the room are married by asking each of the faculty
membersif they are married, as well as the other persons in the
room. In this case, the major premise is knownby means of the
conclusion and a circularity

is created between the conclusion

as following from the premises and how one of the prem{ses is
known. This does not mean that one of the premises could only
be knownby means of the conclusion, but only that in this case
a premise cannot be used by a person as evidence for a conclusion

since it was by means of the conclusion that he knew the premise.
These are two ways in which a conclusion may be used as
evidence for the truth of one of the premises.

What is present-

ly at issue is whether or not the dependency which exists
between the premises and the conclusion of a categorical

syllo-

gism when the propositions are contingent amounts to a begging
of the question.

The possibility · certainly exists since the

propositions are contingent and not self-evident
be if they were essentially

necessary.

as they would

However, it is not as if

the conclusion actually appears as a pcemise in a way which
would make the propositions identical,

nor is it necessary that

the conclusion actually be offered as evidence for the truth of
either one of the premises.

What is in fact the case is that

the premises presuppose the truth of the conclusion in the way
it was explained above. The question then is whether or not
this presupposition amounts to the conclusion being an implicit
premise of the syllogism such that it is a case of an attempt to
prove that which is not self-evident

by means of itself.

Presuppositions and arguments:
Insofar as various laws such as the law of non-contradiction
and the law of identity are presupposed by everything which in any
sense "is," all arguments presuppose them. The concepts found in
the propositions constituting

the argument, the propositions

themselves, their truth, the validity of the argument, etc.,

all
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presuppose the law of non-contradiction and the law of identity.
However, these presuppositions which are present even if the
syllogism is an actual proof do not appear as premises in the
proof itself.
principii

No one would claim that there is a petitio

simply because there is a presupposition to the proof.

But what if that which is presupposed is the conclusion, as it
is in the example under discussion?

The argument certainly cannot

be a proof, but from this it does not follow that it is a
petitio

principii.
In the case of a sound categorical syllogism with premises

that are contingent, the soundness of the syllogism presupposes
the truth of the conclusion, not in the trivial

sense that it

must be true, as mast also the premises, if the syllogism is to
be sound; but in the sense that the truth of each of the premises
presupposes the truth of the conclusion in a way that any uncertainty about the conclusion extends also to 'the premises.

The truth

of the premises follows from the truth of the conclusion in the
sense that the truth of the contingent propositions follows because the particular

instances possess what is affirmed by the

predicate, and at least some of these same particular
are referred to by the conclusion.

instances

The truth of the conclusion is

therefore in this way presupposed by the premises.

The conclusion,

in its capacity as a presupposition for the soundness of the
syllogism, since its truth is presupposed for the truth of the
premises, therefore contributes to the truth of the premises in
particular

and to the soundness of the syllogism in general.

The
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conclusion does not appear explicitly

as a premise in the syllo-

gism although its truth is presupposed by each of the premises;
and therefore when the true premises are offered as evidence
for the conclusion it is difficult

not to conclude that there is

an attempt to prove the truth of the conclusion by means of
itself.
For example, consider that when a person is presented
with a valid syllogism this person asks for proof of the fact
that it is valid.

Suppose further that the person who presented

the argument offers a second syllogism of the same form with a
conclusion affirming the validity of the first
would undoubtedly corrmit a petitio

principii

syllogism.

He

even though the

conclusion does not appear explicitly as a premise in the syllogism. The truth of the conclusion is nevertheless still presupposed, but not for the actual truth of either of the premises.
It is rather that the validity of the form of the syllogism is
asserted by the conclusion of the argument having the same valid
form. The conclusion is in this sense an implicit premise in the
syllogism, for its truth is presupposed in the very attempt to
prove its truth.
The same appears true in the case of a syllogism with
contingent premises.

The conclusion does not appear as an actual

premise in the argument, but there is a dependency of the truth
of the premises on the truth of the conclusion.

Any uncertainty

about the truth of the conclusion extends also to the premises.
This would seem to mean that the conclusion is an implicit
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premise in the syllggism, for its truth is presupposed in the
attempt of the premises to prove its truth.
This seems to amount to the accusation that all categorical
syllogisms with contingent propositions commit the fallacy of
petitio

principii.

A final judgement can only be made if a

more detailed explanation is given on the precise nature of a
petitio

principii.

The conventional use of the term itself

course plays a decisive role.

of

What certainly can be concluded

is that the presupposition of the truth of the premises on the
truth of the conclusion due to their contingent character represents no proof of the conclusion.

What will now be shown

is how a syllogism wit~ premises that are essentially

necessary

is an actual proof of the truth of the conclusion.
An actual proof:
Whenthe premises of a valid syllogism are essentially
necessary propositions,

the truth of the conclusion is proven

by the truth of the premises by way of the valid form of the
argument. Since the premises are essentially
truth does not follow from each particular
predicate.

necessary, their

instance having the

The proposition does not even explicitly

any particular

refer to

instances, and is true even if no particular

instances exist or will ever exist.
necessity of the proposition,

Because of the essential

if a particular

instance does

exist, then it must necessarily possess the predicate.

The

truth of the proposition, however, does not depend on the
existence of any particular

instances.

In an essentially
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necessary proposition, the object referred to by the subject
concept may or may not be embodied in a particular

instance;

a particular

If a particu-

being having a contingent existence.

by

lar contingent being did exist which possessed in its essence
what was referred to by the essentially

necessary proposition,

then the being which has a contingent existence would nevertheless possess something in its essence necessarily.
essentially

necessary proposition,

Thus, the

''A mortal being is not the ·

cause of its own existence," is true even if no mortal beings
exist.

If a mortal being does exist, then it will belong

necessarily to its essence that it was not the cause of its own
existence;

it will belong necessarily to its mortality that

it was not the cause of its own existence.
The following syllogism is an example of a proof:
A value response can be given only be a being capable
of cognitive acts.
Love is a value response.
Love can only be given by a being capable of cognitive
acts.
In this syllogism, the truth of each of the premises does not
depend on the existence of any particular

instances.

The

premises are true even if no beings caoable of cognitive acts
exist or if no beings giving the value response of love exist;
for the premises refer to the nature or essence of love and to
the essence of a value response.
from the fact that particular

Their truth does not follow

instances have what is affirmed

by the predicate as it would if the premises were contingent.
Thus, in this syllogism the truth 6f each of the premises
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does not depend on the truth of the conclusion as it did in the
case of a syllogism with contingent premises.

The truth of

the conclusion is instead proven by the truth of the premises;
from their truth the truth of the conclusion necessarily follows
and is itself

essentially

necessary since its truth was proven

by premises which were themselves essentially

necessary.

Proofs and sound arguments:
The lack of probative force in categorical syllogisms
which are constituted by contingent propositions may be described
in the following manner. Whenin a proposition, the predicate
does not belong necessarily to the subject, the fact that it
does belong to the subject will derend upon the fact that each
instance of _what it affirms in fact has what the predicate refers
to.

However, the conclusion of a valid categorical

syllogism

with contingent premises refers to at least some of the same
instances on which the truth of each of the premises depends.
For this reason, any uncertainty about the truth of the conclusion
must extend also to the premises.

Furthermore, in this way, the

truth of the premises need the truth of the concluion for their
own truth;

they depend upon the truth of the conclusion.

premises, therefore,

The

cannot by their truth prove the truth of

the conclusion since the truth of the conclusion would already be
presupposed if they were true.
However, in the case of a categorical syllogism constituted
by essentially

necessary propositions no such dependency between

the premises and the conclusion exists.

Since the predicate of
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the proposition belongs to the subject necessarily that which
makes for the truth of the proposition is entirely different
with respect to each of the premises and the conclusion.

Using

the example of a proof just presented above, it is because of
the very nature of a value response that it presupposes a cognitive act;

the cognitive act by which the value is apprehended.

Similarly it is because of the essence of what love is that
makes for its being a value response.
the predicate is intelligibly

In each of these cases

grounded in the nature of the

subject, and therefore their truth does not follow from the fact
that love presupposes a cognitive act.

The distinctness

of each

of the affirmed states of fact does not exist in the case of contingent propositions.

Whenthe latter

comprise a categorical

syllogism, the states of fact affirmed are more closely re.lated
due to the commonality existing between them since they refer to
at least some of the same particular
predicate is not intelligibly

instances.

Because the

grounded in the subject, its

truth follows from the fact that the particular

instances have

what the proposition affirms they have. But at least some of
the same particular

instances are referred to by both ·premises

and the conclusion and therefore their truth is not distinct
each other like in the case of essentially
This lack of distinctness

from

necessary propositions.

in syllogisms comprised by con-

tingent propositions may be reflected

in the way the truth of

the premises is known, just as the presence of this distinctness
may be reflected

in the way the truth of essentially

necessary

premises is known. But. the question of this distinctness

is

ultimately a metaphysical one grounded in the nature of the state

of fact the proposition affirms, and this will always be reflected in the question of the probative force of the premises. 38
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The problem of whether or not a conclusion can be proven
in a way other tha_n the premises being essentially necessary
is a question which cannot be presently investigated.
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CH.~PTER
FOUR

MILLAND PFANDER
REEXAMINED

Since an investigation

has been made into the issues and

problems raised by Mill and Pfander, their views can now be reexamined. Any praise or criticism which can be made aqainst
either of them must rest on a foundation established by lookinq
at reality

itself.

It is insiqnific~nt

to criticize

an author

merely for beinq inconsistent when one· of his positions is the
correct one; and it is ludicrous to praise a writer for beinq
consistent when his entire system is not adequate to reality.
This brief critique of Mill and Pfander will therefore not consist
of an attempt to merely point out internal inconsistencies within
each of their positions.

Instead, each of their positions will be

compared and contrasted with the results achieved in Chapter
Three.
On Mi11:
Mill is certainly correct to the extent of revealinq that
some arguments represent no proof of the conclusion.

Mill extended

this to all arguments and is in this respect in· error;

for some

arguments actually prove the truth of the conclusion.

Further, the

evidence which Mill furnishes in support of his accusation against
the probative force of the syllogism is suspect for the followinq
reasons.
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Mill's explanation of validity,
his claim regarding the petitio

which is the foundation of

princioii,

does not in fact

support the kind of presupposition he claims exists between the
conclusion and the major premise. There is certainly a sense in
which the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the
premises for otherwise the argument would be invalid.

In other

words, since the conclusion of a valid arqument cannot assert
more than can be concluded with necessity from the premises one
can say that the conclusion is found in the premises.

This sense

in which one says that the conclusion is contained in the premises
certainly is not the same as when the conclusion of an araument is
repeated as a premise wh1ch is one example of the petitio
printipii . Within the context of validity in cateqorical sylloqisms
the minor term appears in one of the premises and the major-term
appears in the other remaining premise. The minor term and the
major term are united, so to speak, by means of the middle term,
which allows one to conclude that the major term belongs to the
minor terms, as long as the argument is valid.

The conclusion of

a valid argument is in this sense contained in both of the premises.
However, Mill claims that in the syllo0ism he presented, the conclusion was presupposed in the major premise, but this does not
follow from the meaning of validity . By the validity of the arqument, the conclusion is contained in the premises taken toqether
and not in only one of the premises.

This is true whether the

syllogism is a proof or not, and follows only from the validity of
the argument. In a valid argument, the conclusion is as much
contained in one premise as the other, thou~h it is more correct
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to speak of the conclusion contained in both premises toqether.
Therefore, it is not possib1e for Mill to assert that the conclusion of the syllogism he presents is contained in the major
premise based on the notion of validity.

If the conclusion is

contained in the major premise it must do so for some other
reason which Mill does not mention in the passaqe quoted.
From this it also follows that Mill's accusation of a
petitio ·principii

cannot rest solely on the notion of validity.

The sense in which the conclusion of a valid argument i~ contained
in the premises does not at all constitute a beqging of the
question.
Twofurther points against Mill can also be made. The first
concerns in what sense the conclusion of the sylloqism he presents
can be presupposed in the major premise.

The conclusion cannot be

contained in a way that would allow one to infer by way of
immediate inference the truth of the conclusion from the truth of
the premise.

From the premise, "All men are mortal ,

follow ·that, "Socrates is mortal.

11

it does not

It must also be established

that Socrates is a man. Without the latter
the conclusion cannot be inferred.

11

included as a premise

Therefore, the conclusion is

not contained in the major premise in the way it would if the conclusion could be inferred iMIT1edi'ately.A second point which must
be made is that it is clear that in some syllogisms the conclusion
is not contained in the major premise.

In the syllogism,

Someinhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of the
United States
All -the inhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of
North America·
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Someinhabitants of the United States are
i nhabitan ts of North. Jlmerica.
the conclusion is not presupposed by the major premise in the way
Mill described.
particular

It is true that Mill uses in his attack only one

form of a categorical sylloqism, and it is clear that

he would extend his accusation to every valid form of cateqorical
sylloqism. . The above example would, therefore,

show that the

conclusion cannot be contained in the major premise in every case.
Yet, could Mill say that it was included in the minor premise?
Another difficulty

which also presents itself

is that Mill uses in

the syllogism he presents singular propositions.
sition refers to one particular

instance.

A singular propo-

A final remark can be

made regarding these problems.
It seems that Mill confuses two ways in which one can speak
of the sylloqism being a deductive argument proceeding from general
to particular.

The first

sense would apply to the notion of

validity in a way already explained.

The conclusion of a valid ar-

gument, insofar as it does not go beyond the premises cannot
possess more generality than the premises.

A second sense is also

one explained in detail and applies to the way a proposition may be
said to depend on existing particular

instances.

a syllogism need not at all refer to a particular
particular

The conclusion of
instance or some

instances which are referred to by the major premise.

Mill's use of singular propositions certainly suggests that he would
be of the latter

opinion.

This brings one to the question of whether or not the
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presupposition which Mill had in mind between the conclusion
and the major premise is the same as the one explained in
Chapter Three re~arding contingent propositions.

If so, Mill

is incorrect in maintaining that such a presupposition is
present only between the conclusion a.nd the major premise.
premises would be involved.

Both

Furthermore, Mill would fail to

see that his accusation does not apply to all syllogisms.

This

failure may rest on certain metaphysical beliefs which would
preclude the possibility

of essentiaily

necessary states of

fact.
A final judgement would involve a more extensive examination
of his entire works which cannot presently be undertaken.
Ori.Pfander:
It is of course clear that the results of the investigation
made into the question of the probative force of the syllogism
.
.

comemuch closer to the views of Pf'ander than they did in the case
of Mill. Pf'ander's distinction
a relationship

between a relationship

of truth and

of proof can certainly apply to arguments which are

sound but which contain contingent propositions and proofs con- _
taining essentially

necessary propositions.

Pfander made between collective

The distinction

which

inductive universal judgements and

proving deductive universal is similar though not identical

to the

distinction

For

between contingent and necessary propositions.

Pfander, an essentially

necessary proposition would represent one

kind of proving deductive universal judgement.

Nevertheless,

Pfander would ce_rtainly a~ree that any sylloqisrn containing
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essentially

necessary propositions was in fact a proof of the

conclusion.

However, the followinq criticism must be made not

unrelated to this point.
Pfander agrees with Mill that in some cases the conclusion
of an argument is included in the more universal premise.

To

this extent the same criticism of Mill applies also to Pf°ander.
In Pfander s example, the premise,
1

11

All the windows of the house

are open, is said to include the conclusion,
11

of the house is open.

11

11

The studio window

Yet, if this were so, one

would be able

to conclude from the premise the truth of the conclusion;

but

this cannot be done. Pfander's argument is not an immediate inference for the simple reason that there is no certainty that
the house has a studio window. From the premise that all the
windowsof the house are open, one can conclude that some or at
least one of the windowsis open, but not that the studio window
is open; for how is one to knowthat the house even has a studio
window.
Since Pfander claims that the conclusion is included in the
premise, he also maintains that the truth of the premise presupposes the truth of the conclusion.

From this it follows that

there is no proof, which is the same conclusjon that was reached
regarding arguments with contingent premises.

Apparently however,

the explanation behind each view is different.

Whenthe premises

are contingent the truth of the premises presupposes the truth of
the conclusion because at least some of the particular

instances

on which the truth of each depends are the same. But this does
not mean the conclusion is included in one of the premises.

The
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truth of each of the premises in a syllogism presuppose the truth
of the conclusion whenever the premises are continqent.

The con-

clusion is contained in the premises of any syllogism which is
valid and this would apply to a relationship

of proof.

There is

not a sense in which the conclusion is contained in only one
premise of a syllogism.

Accordinq to the validity

of the syllo-

gism, the conclusion is contained in the premises taken together,
and if the premises are contingent, each of the premises presupposes
the truth of the conclusion.
These precedinq remarks must suffice as a critique of
Pfander and Mill.

It is hoped that thejr insiqhts have been separa·-

ted from their errors, and that this entire investiqation
justice

to reality;

has done

for the separation of truth from error is

possible only if reality

is the final judge.
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